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focuses on Indigenous self-determination. This interpretive lens raises questions about why
jurisprudence has been built the way it has, exploring an underlying principled approach
(which treats Aboriginal rights as claims of groups accorded weight within the multicultural
setting of modern liberal democracy). This analysis highlights why current jurisprudential
approaches leave no room for robust forms of Indigenous self-determination. The endgame
is predetermined; namely, the authority of Indigenous collectives is severely diminished. If
identifying who proper rights-holders are is left to Canadian courts, we fail to engage with
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DETERMINING WHO THE PROPER rights-holder is has increasingly emerged as a

serious issue in disputes centred on Aboriginal rights and title. One development
driving this discussion has been the shift in focus to matters of duties to consult
and accommodate. Post-Haida Nation, the Crown has acknowledged that when it
contemplates authorizing activity that may adversely afect Aboriginal rights and
title, even when these rights are merely asserted, it will often be legally required
to engage with those potentially afected.1 Consequently, there has been a rise
of such instruments as impact beneft agreements, means by which third-party
proponents of projects impacting Aboriginal lands and waters can achieve their
desired degree of certainty.2 Who, though, are the proper Aboriginal rights
and title-holders? Who should be consulted when the Crown contemplates
authorizing activity on lands and waters over which Aboriginal rights and title can
be asserted? Who can enter into negotiations around side agreements concerning
projects that will seriously impact Aboriginal lands and waters?
Tis article looks at a matter that underlies these developments and the
questions that swirl around them. Questions can arise as to which Aboriginal
collective or representative should be approached, as often there are, quite simply,
many diverse collectives that may be approached. Consider, for example, Crown–

1.

2.

Tis all emerged from a trilogy of cases from the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004-2005.
See Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73; Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74; Mikisew Cree
First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69.
As companies seek authorization for their projects from the Crown, they can avoid getting
caught up in long, complex, and opaque consultation processes by reaching mutually
benefcial side-agreements with potentially afected Aboriginal communities.
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industry–Indian3 negotiations involving proposed resource development on
lands over which rights may exist, rights that may include title. In almost all such
situations, the Crown approaches local First Nations, where these are typically
small communities living on reserves, which are governed under a band council
system. Increasingly, challenges to these bodies are being launched from multiple
directions. For example, members of these communities may argue their band
councils: (a) do not speak for them as their legitimate governments (or legitimate
representatives); and (b) have no authority outside that mandated in the Indian
Act4 (that is, beyond the limited powers delegated through the Indian Act, powers
which are all limited to reserve lands). In these and other sorts of situations, other
Indigenous bodies are being presented as legitimate rights and title-holders.5
To keep this discussion manageable, I focus on claims to site-specifc
Aboriginal rights.6 Tese sorts of claims underlay many recent developments we
witness, as they are most often claims to rights that connect to lands beyond
the geographic boundaries of any particular reserve. If we think again of merely
asserted rights, the degree to which the Crown is obligated to consult depends on
the potential impact of the proposed activity on these rights (should they exist)
and strength of claim, the ability of the Aboriginal community asserting the rights
3.

4.
5.

See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24), reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5. Tis section holds that exclusive federal jurisdiction applies to “Indians
and lands reserved for Indians.” See also Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(2), being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. Tis states that “In this Act,
‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.” In
the rest of this article, I use the term “Aboriginal,” but I am referring specifcally to Indians as
this term is used in section 35.
RSC 1985, c I-5.
See e.g. Wesley v Canada, 2017 FC 725 at para 4. Justice Barnes notes:
Yahaan [Donald Wesley, applicant for judicial review of processes tied to approval of the Pacifc
Northwest LNG project in northwestern British Columbia] purports to be the Head Chief or
sm’oogit of the Gitwilgyoots. Gitwilgyoots is one of nine tribes that together constitute the
Coast Tsimshian Nation. In his capacity as sm’oogit, Yahaan claims to be authorized to act on
behalf of all members of the tribe for the purpose of asserting their unique and collective rights
to consultation and accommodation. According to Yahaan, he succeeded to the position of
sm’oogit upon the death of his maternal uncle, Harold Dudoward, in 2007. Tis status was
confrmed by custom during a community feast held at Lax Kw’Alaams in 2008.

6.

While assertions of Aboriginal title are increasingly commonplace, underscoring duties to
consult and accommodate, there are still in Canada very few cases dealing specifcally with
Aboriginal title. Further, much of what is said here about who the rights-holders might
be for site-specifc Aboriginal rights-claims applies closely to what could be said about
Aboriginal title claims.
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to build a case that they are rights that ought to be seriously considered. Just over
the reserve boundary of any particular First Nation it is not clear, however, that
the band council for this community has any particular say in relation to these
claimed rights.
Tis focus on site-specifc Aboriginal rights claims is channeled through a
second very specifc lens. Indeed, this second analytical lens is what ultimately
directs the investigation in this work. Too quickly, questions about proper
rights-holders seem to fnd their place within Canadian courts, subject to the
reasoning of a non-Indigenous institution, one that makes up a component
of the triad of the modern state, while the fundamental matter concerns how
independent Indigenous communities assert their identities in the face of Crown
activities. Trying to make sense of this matter within Canadian courts—where
arguably Indigenous self-determination will be left to one side—is extremely
problematic, not simply because of the threat of narrow-minded reasoning, but
because it may contribute to the diminishment of Indigenous self-determination
in relation to fundamentally important matters. Tis article explores how
questions about who might properly hold site-specifc rights might be addressed
within Canadian law, should Indigenous self-determination be taken seriously.
My primary objective in this article is to show how Canadian courts approach
questions about proper rights-holders, and how they are likely to build on their
current approach should they be directly faced with these matters. Te outcome
of this examination is the realization that not only is it very likely there will be
little room for notions of Indigenous self-determination to play a role in the
deliberations of Canadian courts, but it is also arguable that how the Supreme
Court has built jurisprudence seems designed to prevent the authority of
Indigenous peoples from playing a role in resolving these matters. Not only will
Indigenous peoples not be able to assert that bodies they constitute hold rights
and responsibilities in Canada in relation to their lands and waters, but Canadian
courts will almost certainly answer questions about proper rights-holders by
considering only those rights the courts will imagine and countenance—
specifcally, those limited to essentially cultural matters.
In this article, I consider how Canadian courts are likely to approach
questions about proper rights-holders in a series of stages. First, I look into the
matter of precedent, asking how much we can divine about how the Supreme
Court of Canada will approach such questions should they principally make use
of existing case law. Tis frst stage is itself broken down into two parts, as I frst
explore how these questions will likely be approached within the Van der Peet
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framework,7 and then consider how the Supreme Court might push past this
framework (using Delgamuukw as a guide).8
Finding there are gaps in the jurisprudence and novel issues to address, I turn
in the second stage of analysis to what animates existing case law. We witness
from Sparrow onward a certain form of understanding the Court has applied
to the recognition and afrmation of the existing Aboriginal (and treaty) rights
of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada,9 a form of understanding that functions
to both generate a sense of the nature of the problems Canadian courts must
grapple with and then what the solutions might be.10
Te stage is illuminating, as we see there are currently two strong forces
at play, one within the reasoning of the high Court, the other dancing around
its edges. On the one hand, we can see how the Court has been crafting a
particular approach grounded in a liberal democratic sense of how diferent
cultural groups can make claims to have their ways of living protected from state
interference. Te fact that this approach is predominant explains much of what
we see and can expect to see within the jurisprudence of Canadian courts vis-à-vis
Aboriginal claims.11 On the other hand, we can see that one thing the Court
is aware of, but cannot accommodate in any serious manner within a liberal
democratic framework, is the push for self-determination by Indigenous peoples.
One suggestion that emerges from this article’s analysis is that it is arguable the
Supreme Court hopes to defuse the radical nature of this push by taming what
it may within Canadian law and policy. Dictating certain responses to who the
proper rights-holders might be could go a long way to achieving this end.
At the end of all this, we are left with Indigenous self-determination,
a matter whose serious content is seemingly neutralized in the case law by how
the Court has built up decades of jurisprudence. Should one try to advance
serious arguments within the framework of the Canadian system that the power
of Indigenous self-determination should determine who proper rights-holders
7.
8.
9.

R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507.
Delgamuukw v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 1010.
See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 3, s 35(1). Tis section states that “Te existing [A]
boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and afrmed.” See also R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]. Tis was the frst
case from the Supreme Court of Canada to explore the meaning and implications of this
constitutional provision.
10. Where the nature of the solutions depends fundamentally on how the Court has determined
what the problems are.
11. For an extended discussion, see Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous
Self-Determination (University of Toronto Press, 2019) chs 6-8.
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might be, outcomes to be expected are predetermined and too narrow to be
satisfactory. It is, if you will, a rigged game. Te analysis in this article ends,
then, with some discussion about where to go with all this. Is there some process
that promises something other than the continued dissolution of Indigenous
self-determination? Are there mechanisms or instruments that might be developed
that move us away from the seemingly endless varieties of rigged games on tap?

I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH IDENTIFICATION OF THE RIGHTSHOLDER MAY BE AN ISSUE
While a wide range of possible situations arise in which questions can be
raised about who holds and who can exercise rights recognized under section
35, I restrict my discussion to a single specifc, though broad, sort of situation
wherein Canadian courts may be called upon to determine which Aboriginal
“community” holds rights that are defned by and protected within a specifc area.
Before we begin, note I place “community” within scare-quotes to highlight
my intent not to prejudge the nature of the collectives under discussion. Tese
might be First Nations living entirely within the Indian Act, First Nations
operating under the Indian Act but engaged in generations-long struggles
to maintain a substantial measure of independence, larger collections of First
Nations (sometimes grouped in visible associations such as Tribal Councils or the
like, but sometimes amalgamated in ways less visible to the outside gaze), or those
collectives—or components of those collectives—that understand themselves to
be, and have been for a very long time, Indigenous nations (where nationhood
itself is something the specifc Indigenous collective gives meaning to).12
Our focus in the upcoming discussions falls heavily on the last kind of
community, as when we engage with this entity, we enter into problems about
proper rights-holders that cast the approach of the Canadian system into
question. A people who retain a signifcant sense of themselves as constituting a
nation or polity that emerges out of the original socio-political body inhabiting
an area (before the arrival of and interference by colonial bodies) will have its own
understandings of rights and responsibilities, its own understandings of how it
organizes itself internally and in relation to others, and its own understandings of
12. With all Inuit now living within one or another modern treaty their matters of identity
for the purposes of rights under section 35 are not subject to the problems we address in
this article. Te Métis, on the other hand, bring into this picture their own set of concerns,
but on the most general level—asking about how the Supreme Court will bring in
community-scale—the situations in which they might be wrapped up in are similar.
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who might be proper decision-makers when it comes to deciding how lands and
waters are approached by humans.
Tis is the complex landscape where questions about proper rights-holders
fall. We narrow focus to when a site-specifc Aboriginal right is at issue.13 Te
general framework for establishing an Aboriginal right was set out in R v Van
der Peet.14 An Aboriginal community must show that at contact with Europeans,
a practice, custom, or tradition being used today was integral to the distinctive
culture of that people at that time (the integral to the distinctive culture test).
An Aboriginal community claiming, for example, a right to hunt in a territory,
a site-specifc Aboriginal right, would need to establish that, at contact with
Europeans, hunting in that area was an integral aspect of their distinctive culture.
A site-specifc rights-claim, then, is one in which a right to be established under
the Van der Peet test is expected to be defned such that it is connected to a
specifc location or area, where a Canadian court may be called upon to probe the
nature of the Aboriginal community that would hold this right.
In R v Bernard, Mr. Bernard, a member of the larger Mi’kmaq nation, had
been charged with hunting within Mi’kmaq territory, albeit in an area at some
remove from the specifc Mi’kmaq community from which he had family roots.
Te Court of Appeal of New Brunswick held that the common law in Canada
already determines that with site-specifc Aboriginal rights there is a requirement
of community continuity.15 Tat is, if an Aboriginal community present at contact
with Europeans satisfed the Van der Peet test for an Aboriginal right, a modern
community must enjoy a measure of continuity with the historic community in
order to assert the right at that site.

13. A second situation where the question of proper rights-holders can arise is when Aboriginal
title is at issue. With Aboriginal title claims, the aim is to establish that at the time of
the assertion of Crown sovereignty, an area was occupied in such a manner as to show
exclusivity and “sufcient” occupation (defned as regular use). See Tsilhqot’in Nation v
British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. In such circumstances a Canadian court may
be called upon to inquire into the nature of the Aboriginal community that exclusively and
sufciently occupied the lands in question, particularly when there may be suspicion that the
community making the claim is not the same as the historical community. Interestingly, the
only two cases directly addressing title that reached the Court (Delgamuukw, supra note 8
and Tsilhqot’in) were by original and reconstituted traditional Indigenous polities. Arguably,
this is how it should be, given that within Canadian law, non-reserve lands are not under the
jurisdiction, and are in no way the property of, band councils (whose authority is mandated
to extend only to reserve lands).
14. Supra note 7.
15. 2017 NBCA 48 [Bernard].
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Tere are two troubling scenarios suggested by this hypothetical. First, it may
be that Aboriginal communities in the area in which this location exists have
shifted geographically since contact with Europeans, such that an Aboriginal
community now inhabits and practices traditional activities in this location
while a socio-culturally distinct Aboriginal community did so at contact. Second,
it may be that there are varied registers of community, such that one could say a
large-scale Aboriginal community inhabited at contact the larger area surrounding
and including the specifc site at issue in this case, while subunits within this
larger community have moved around within this area over time. One might then
fnd that something like the frst scenario holds, where a subunit now practices
traditional activities at the specifc location at issue where historically a diferent
subunit practiced such activities there, and where both subunits are components
of the larger socio-cultural community). Both scenarios are troubling, but the
second brings us closer to the problems on which I wish to focus.16
One might say the basic question before us appears to be about nothing
but community-scale, and how this can afect whether a proper rights-holder
is in place to make a claim. Clearly, there is already in Canadian law a
community-continuity requirement, if by this is meant that at some specifc
location should a member of an Aboriginal community engage in an activity that
this person’s community hopes to argue is protected, this community would need
to be the community that traditionally had this activity be an aspect of a custom,
practice or tradition integral to its distinctive culture at this location. Te only
real challenge that seems to arise concerns whether the community identifed here
must be (or should be) a local community (that is, a people intimately tied to this
specifc area, both historically and contemporarily), or whether the holder of the
right in question could be (or should be) that larger socio-cultural community (of
which any local community has been traditionally a part).
Problems that actually arise, however, are about much more than just
community-scale. Consider common contemporary situations, in which we
usually fnd a First Nation assumed to be the Aboriginal rights-holder for the area
immediately around that community, where such a local community is in fact
16. Tis is not to dismiss problems associated with the frst—it also speaks to a range of
troubling assumptions and principles at play in how Aboriginal rights are developed and
function in contemporary Canada—however, time and space restrictions mean that this
cannot be the place to engage with issues that arise due to the displacement of peoples
through settler-colonial pressures. Most obvious, of course, is the fact that events propelled
by the often-uncontrolled nature of settler expansion account for much of the displacement
of peoples, with, for example, a steady westward push through the nineteenth century and
early in the twentieth century.
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the product of a generations-long process of attempted political dismemberment
carried out by the federal government (part of an overall historical process on
the part of the colonial state of cutting up and replacing larger socio-politically
defned peoples). It may be, however, that within this contemporary body there
are (sometimes cutting across a number of these units) more traditional entities,
such as family-groups, clans, houses, et cetera, that could arguably be the bodies
with legitimate claims to access and control resources made available through
activities identifed as Aboriginal rights.17 Tis is just one way to complicate
the narrative, and thinking it through opens the door wide to the larger set of
issues that site-specifc Aboriginal rights invites. When we addressed the way the
Supreme Court has framed the matter, we discussed socio-cultural bodies, and
yet when we think of attempts at dismembering larger pre-existing Indigenous
polities, and the weakening the sub-units within such bodies may have endured,
we cannot help but turn to matters of politics and of self-determination.
Tis is ultimately where attention must be drawn, as we come to see that
deeper challenges have to do with the meeting of two diferent ways of thinking
about the nature of Indigenous communities. Te superfcial manner introduced
frst sees the only relevant distinction being between a larger socio-cultural
community and smaller subunits that historically would have comprised the
larger body. Canadian law seems to frame any sort of situation like this as one in
which a larger, and fairly amorphous, socio-cultural body, over the generations,
has been divided into what we see today—First Nations, those small communities
that are relatively fxed to local areas. Te second possibility, however, is of larger
socio-cultural-political bodies, comprised of all diferent kinds of possible smaller
components —families, extended families, houses, clans, nations—where the
larger socio-political body is most often ignored by the state, while these smaller
17. See Delgamuukw, supra note 8; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 13. Tese are British Columbia cases
regarding claims to Aboriginal title that reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In both,
the claimants were the original larger socio-cultural-political bodies, the nations from which
First Nation bands had been carved by federal and provincial authorities over time. However,
claims for title at present seem to be advanced by subunits, which appear to be segments of
original larger socio-cultural-political bodies to which they were traditionally connected.
Te issue of community-scale can arise, as Canadian courts are likely to be called upon to
determine which scale of community can hold title to an area. For example, on the northwest
coast of Vancouver Island, the Nuchatlaht First Nation which is historically a component
of the larger Nuu-chah-nult, has advanced a claim in spring of 2017 being provided with
dates for trial. See e.g. Chad Pawson, “Vancouver Island’s Nuchatlaht following Tsilhqot’in
in Land, Title Claim,” CBC News (20 January 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
british-columbia/nuchatlaht-fles-aboriginal-land-title-case-bc-supreme-court-1.3945593>
[perma.cc/7FNW-8Q3K].
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components fnd themselves buried under the imposition of the band council/
reserve system.
When discussion opens up to this larger dimension, when we put into play
Indigenous collectives as polities, a new range of questions arise. What kinds of
rights could the larger socio-political body claim within Canadian law? Would
the exercise of these rights impact the ability of subcommunities to exercise their
Aboriginal rights?18 Could the larger body, for example, hold rights to regulate
activities in its traditional territory? Would such a right be limited to regulating
the activity of the members of this group? Why would it not be that such a
collective, having authority in relation to its territory, could exercise this authority
over all activity taking place over the entirety of its lands and waters?
We begin, however, with these questions momentarily set aside. Our frst
task is to determine as best we can, with consideration to precedent, where
the Supreme Court of Canada might go in addressing the sorts of questions
to which current jurisprudence gives rise. As we progress through this analysis,
we gradually introduce considerations that move us further and further toward
having to bring in these other larger matters, as we ask whether we anticipate the
Court will be able to fnd that original (or reconstituted) Indigenous polities are
the rights-holders in relation to site-specifc rights. Tis sort of question opens the
door to deeper issues, as we can then wonder how Canadian law might respond
to robust Indigenous legal and political authority, making claims to determine
how activities take place on Indigenous territories.

II. PRECEDENT
Before we jump into this analysis, we need to ensure we keep frmly in mind
that our focus in this stage is on how Canadian law is likely to deal with matters.
Much of this analysis is dependent on how legal instruments, and the conceptual
18. Tere are disputes that pit band council systems against traditional governance structures,
though they have only recently appeared in common law. See e.g. Wesley, supra note 5;
Gitwangak Indian Band v Davis, 2017 BCSC 744 [Gitwangak]; Spookw v Gitxsan Treaty
Society, 2017 BCCA 16 [Spookw]. In Gitwangak, we fnd an Eviction Order, which
“purports to speak for the Gitwangak Hereditary Chiefs, Gitwangak Huwlip members,
Gitwangak Band members and Gitwangak community members” issued to the band
council of the community, the core dispute arising around the dissolution of a funding
agreement for the Gitwangak Education Society. Other disputes involve complex layers of
community-fracturing. For example, in Spookw, we fnd hereditary chiefs aligned with some
band council leadership in opposition to the continuing work of the Gitxsan treaty society,
a body facilitating treaty negotiations for the Gitxsan First Nation but sufering an apparent
loss of legitimacy in the eyes of many individuals and groups within the community.
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structures within which they are embedded, have been created and structured in
this domestic legal regime. Besides the presumption Canadian law makes that
the issues are only and entirely about socio-cultural bodies, we also fnd discourse
narrowed to the language of rights, where the nature of these sorts of instruments
in the Crown–Aboriginal context has been set out in a string of cases beginning
in the early 1990s. As the discussion unfolds, we will see, this choice of how to
deal with matters refects a specifc understanding of the sorts of problems that
must be dealt with. Tat is, from the perspective of Canadian law, even certain
ways of thinking of what the problems might be—in particular those that refect
Indigenous perspectives—are simply not there to begin with.
But now, on to precedent in Canadian jurisprudence. It helps to begin by
outlining the kinds of questions wrapped up in the set of possible situations
that might arise. One way to do so is by separating questions that focus more
directly on who the rights-holder might be, from questions about the nature of
the activity being explored (which brings in questions about how to characterize
the right), to questions about the specifcation of the kind of right that might be
at issue. We will see it is difcult, if not impossible, to address these diferent sorts
of questions in the relatively isolated form in which I set them out. Tat said,
pulling things apart in this way helps us dig more deeply into how precedent may
function in approaching scenarios in which a site-specifc right is claimed.
Te frst kind of question poses matters in the way we have already touched
upon: for a site-specifc claim, is it a requirement that a local community be the
rights-holder? If not, we could then ask whether precedent sets out factors a
court should consider in deciding between a local community and a larger body,
if a choice presents itself as to whether a local or larger-scale community should
be seen to be the rights-holder.
Te second kind of question is concerned with the ways rights-claims
concerning site-specifc matters may be characterized. Here we imagine the Van
der Peet framework requires all rights-claims be of one kind (namely, a claim must
concern practices, customs and traditions argued to be integral to the distinctive
culture of the people making the claim). One can imagine multiple sorts of
rights-claims fulflling that requirement circling around the sort of situation we
are investigating. For example, while a right to hunt in the specifc area could be
claimed, so could (potentially at least) a claim be made by the larger Aboriginal
community that it enjoys an Aboriginal right to regulate hunting, either amongst
its constituent subunits or more generally on its territory (including, then,
hunting by the local Aboriginal community in the specifc site in question).

12
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Finally, the third sort of question looks to possible forms of rights that could
be claimed. Here we imagine the Van der Peet framework could be broadened
and ask about rights that could be found under section 35 that do not necessarily
have to squeeze themselves into the integral to the distinctive culture mould.19

III. WHO COULD BE THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDERS?
We begin with the set of questions focused directly on who the rights-holder
might be, asking whether a local or a larger-scale community should be seen to
be the rights-holder, or whether there is an approach to resolving this matter that
should be adopted.20 Leaving aside questions that normally intrude at this point—
about, for example, what it means for an activity to be integral or distinctive, and
whether the activity in question meets these amorphous requirements—we focus
on the matter of the community or people claiming the right in question.
Leaving aside the fact that almost all cases have been brought by First Nations,
can we fnd precedent emerging from existing cases that might help settle the
question as to whether, with respect to site-specifc claims, the local community
should be seen to be the rights-holder (or precedent that more generally sets out
rules about how to approach the question)? Besides the fact that the majority of
cases have proceeded on the presumption that the local, reserve-based Aboriginal
community is rightfully the properly-placed claimant, in Bernard the Court of
Appeal of New Brunswick considered how remarks of the Court in Powley—in
the context of Métis claims—should be seen to apply to First Nation-centered
site-specifc claims.21 Noting that Powley was decided on the basis that it was
necessary that the Métis establish (a) the presence of a historic community in
19. A more general question is about whether some principled approach needs to be developed
such that courts can work out in any given situation which sort of right should be the focus
of their analysis and adjudication (though here we also have to begin to think about how the
Court might construct an alternate test for diferent sorts of section 35 rights).
20. If we put this in terms of whether a claimed-right is best conceptualized as holding over a
narrowly defned area or over a larger expanse of lands (and possibly waters) we simply arrive
back at the same sort of place in our analysis. Again, if the concern is simply that site-specifc
rights be linked to specifc areas (and here we are dealing with a tautological matter!) there
is no real dispute. But the question, with this language as our focus, would be about the
extent of the area that serves as the site. Are all site-specifc Aboriginal rights limited to local
areas, or can some such rights be exercised over larger expanses of the territory of a larger
socio-cultural community? Or, is there need for some set of rules that can be applied to
specifc disputes, when it might seem to be possible to say a claim could be applied to either
a localized area or a larger expanse of territory?
21. Bernard, supra note 15.
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the area where the hunting took place, and (b) that the present community be
reasonably contiguous with that community, the court in Bernard went on to say:
Tere would seem to be no rational basis for the claim the Métis peoples only get to
exercise aboriginal rights that are grounded in the existence of a historic and present
community, whereas other aboriginal peoples get to exercise the right regardless of
whether it is so grounded. If that is to be the law, that is for the Supreme Court to
determine. At present, Powley establishes that Aboriginal rights, as communal rights,
may only be exercised by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based membership in a
present community that is linked to the historic community.22

Te key expression to focus upon is linked to. Mr. Bernard is a member
of the Sipekne’katik First Nation, one First Nation within the larger Mi’kmaq
community. Tere is no question that the local community in the area where
the hunting took place is linked to the larger Mi’kmaq nation. As well, there is
no question that the Sipekne’katik is linked to the historic (larger) community.
Tis particular Mi’kmaq First Nation, however, is not geographically close to
the area where Mr. Bernard was hunting. Te trial judge found that whatever
(other) local Mi’kmaq community had existed in the area where Mr. Bernard had
been hunting, there was no evidence that that community was still a presence in
the area, and it was clear Mr. Bernard was not a member of whatever Mi’kmaq
community that might have been.
What we encounter in this reasoning, however, is an analogy that does not
seem particularly strong, one that (as the NBCA presciently acknowledges) the
Supreme Court of Canada will at some point have to address. Is the parallel between
the larger Métis people and local Métis communities the same as what we might
expect between the larger Mi’kmaq nation and local Mi’kmaq communities?
Why, alternatively, would the analogy not track the structure of section 35, being
then between (a) the larger Métis people and local Métis communities, and (b)
the larger body of Indians and local Indigenous communities (i.e., the Mi’kmaq)?
A reasonable suspicion is that the Court was concerned not with the presence
or absence of links per se, but of organizational links, of something more political
than cultural. As much as the Court of Appeal for New Brunswick may have
noted it was not tasked with arguments about Indigenous self-determination,23
this was arguably the matter with which it was grappling, though in an attempt
to keep such considerations of the table. Even absent arguments about
self-determination being made by counsel, reasoning applied by the Court seems
to presume that at contact the Mi’kmaq exercised rights to hunt locally, and that
22. Ibid at para 63.
23. Ibid at para 34.
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no larger political body existed that regulated hunting between local Mi’kmaq
communities. Te only alternative way to make sense of how it proceeds would
be to imagine the Court presumed that any larger, historical Mi’kmaq community
is purely socio-cultural in nature, such that now it makes sense (within the
regime of rights the Supreme Court has constructed) to require site-specifc
rights be reserved to local instantiations of this larger cultural body. One of these
presumptions must be made to make sense of the Court’s requirement that only
the local community that existed in this specifc area at contact can enjoy the
relevant form of continuity with the community making the claim today.
Tis, of course, leads to discussions concerning other sorts of questions
that arise with respect to the proper rights-holder. Why would a Canadian
court seem to presume there could be no matter of Mi’kmaq legal and political
authority intruding upon how to think through this sort of dispute? Tese deeper
discussions, however, should be put of until after we work our way through a
more complete analysis of how precedent is likely to play out. We turn then to
the second set of questions, focusing our attention to the characterization of the
right being claimed; here we presume the framework for rights set out in Van der
Peet is the only one available. In the section after this we explore how Canadian
law might function if this presumption were lifted.

IV. WORKING WITH POSSIBLE RIGHT-CLAIMS WITHIN THE
VAN DER PEET FRAMEWORK
Te Bernard case once again provides an illustrative example. As noted, as the
case advanced past the trial level new arguments were pressed. At the Court of
Appeal for New Brunswick Mr. Bernard—a member of, and representing, the
larger Mi’kmaq Nation—had hoped to argue about rights of self-determination,
in particular how a Mi’kmaq right to self-determination would entail rights
to determine how Mi’kmaq communities, within the larger nation, hunt in
Mi’kmaq territory.
Te Court of Appeal for New Brunswick, however, chose to focus on the
rulings of the trial judge, noting that while Mr. Bernard asked the court “to
consider broader questions, such as self-determination, these questions were not
addressed by either the trial court or the Summary Conviction Appeal Court and
lack a proper evidentiary foundation.”24 It is illuminating, however, to consider
how such arguments about these broader questions might have played out if they
24. Ibid.
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had been properly advanced and supported at the lower courts. How might they
have fared, given existing jurisprudence?
Mr. Bernard had hoped to explore, on appeal, the question “Does the
Mi’kmaq right to hunt include the right to decide who can participate in the
right to hunt?”25 Here, however, we must note two complicating factors.
First, we have to attend to the invocation in Van der Peet that Aboriginal rights
must be established independently, that each practice, custom and tradition must
be shown on its own to be integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal
community in question. At the trial level in Sparrow, the Musqueam had argued
a right to fsh included a right to regulate fshing in their territory.26 But in Van
der Peet, the Supreme Court undercut such moves, holding that each sort of right
must be claimed and established on its own, there would be no piggy-backing on
Aboriginal rights.27 Here, then, we would need the right of self-determination,
argued to be an Aboriginal right, and the right to hunt in this area argued in the
alternative. It would make sense to argue for these two sorts of Aboriginal rights
in one action, as the larger-scale rights-claim—a right of the Mi’kmaq to regulate
hunting by its membership over their entire territory—might fail. It is possible
it might fail as a rights-claim, but it might very well be the case as well that, even
if successful at that stage, the right to regulate might not succeed as a means of
protecting Mr. Bernard’s exercise of his then-acknowledged Mi’kmaq right to
hunt. Tis second sort of failure could come to be, for example, if the larger right
to regulate hunting were found to have been extinguished, to be incompatible
with Crown sovereignty, or to have been justifably infringed.
Second, intimately tied to the frst point, the argument proposed would
actually change the nature of the dispute before the court, as it only makes sense
that once a claim is being made by the larger community to regulate hunting
that the right to hunt—at least within Canadian law—must also be one held by
that collective. Advancing a right to regulate on the part of the Mi’kmaq would,

25. Ibid at para 31.
26. Supra note 9 at para 38. At the Supreme Court of Canada, this argument was transformed
into an argument about discretionary power in relation to the entire matter of fshing, and
the Court pushed that sort of argument aside in the space of a sentence or two.
27. Supra note 7 at para 70. Te Court held that
In identifying those practices, customs and traditions that constitute the aboriginal rights
recognized and afrmed by s. 35(1), a court must ensure that the practice, custom or tradition
relied upon in a particular case is independently signifcant to the aboriginal community
claiming the right. … Incidental practices, customs and traditions cannot qualify as aboriginal
rights through a process of piggybacking on integral practices, customs and traditions.
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conceptually at least, preclude the possibility that site-specifc rights can be held
independently by subunits of the larger collective.
If we have two rights being claimed in the alternative, why could it not be
that the one is held by the local community and the other by the larger Aboriginal
collective? Leave aside for the moment the fact that in ordinary litigation we
would not expect two diferent parties asserting two diferent sorts of rights while
engaged in one dispute. Te situation we are contemplating can be envisioned if
we imagine an individual (like Mr. Bernard) engaged in an activity held to be the
exercise of an Aboriginal right. One might suppose that someone in that position
could argue in one set of arguments in court that he was exercising a right held
by a local community (say, to hunt in this area around this community), while
in another set of arguments in the same action he could argue his actions were
countenanced under the exercise of another right held by a larger community
(say, a right to decide how individuals and subunits of the larger community
hunt over the larger territory, that here included a decision that members of the
local community—of which he is a member—can hunt in this area). But for this
person to argue the activity itself is only possible due to the exercise of a Mi’kmaq
right to regulate hunting (which, when exercised, has authorized his hunting in
this area), the right to hunt must become dependent on the other right’s existence
and deployment. Tese two forms of rights become inextricably tangled together.
One might try to preserve the sense in there being two entirely independent
rights, one held locally and the other by the larger community, by thinking things
through using just the test from Van der Peet. Te way to do this would be to
imagine that evidence has shown that the specifc practice in question (such as
hunting in an area) was integral to the distinctive culture of the local body at
contact and is still such a practice today, while evidence about the practice of
regulating hunting by the larger body shows, as well, that it was integral to the
culture of this larger body, and remains a practice today. But things could work
out this way only if things just happened to work out so, in terms of the practices.
In other words, this would only be possible if in the intervening generations
the larger body has not altered its decisions concerning acceptable patterns
of hunting behavior, or that it had altered how hunting practices by subunits
would be managed but (at least some of ) the subunits had ceased respecting the
authority of the larger body.
We cannot presuppose, however, the sort of harmonious and fortuitously
coordinated set of relations contained in the frst possibility, and once we imagine
the sort of fracturing contained in the second possibility, we open the door to
problematic situations. For instance, an individual might defend him/herself in
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court, arguing s/he is exercising a right authorized under a decision making or
regulatory power of a larger Aboriginal body (say, to hunt in a specifc area), where
a local community of which this individual is not a member—a community,
furthermore, that was historically a part of the larger community—intervenes
in the dispute to argue this person has no right to hunt here, as only the local
community has an Aboriginal right to engage in this specifc activity in this
specifc location.28 Dueling rights seem to be, then, a distinct possibility. Could
there be a proper rights-holder in such a situation? Might it be that both claims
can be supported by sufcient evidence of the right kind in order to meet the
Van der Peet test? How would a Canadian court deal with such a situation? Note
once again that while we are restricting ourselves to how things function within
the Van der Peet-enclosed world we inevitably arrive at matters that are essentially
political and not cultural (as the subunits indirectly take on decision-making
authority in relation to the hunting practices, as they disavow the authority of the
larger Aboriginal body of which they have historically been a part).
Te situation, as complex as it already appears to be, is in need of further
unpacking. We need to think much more carefully about the odds the sort of
right imagined held by the larger community can indeed be argued to exist in
Canadian law, where the right claimed by the larger Indigenous community itself
has two distinct ways of being framed: First, to regulate an activity in relation to
its subunits and individual members; and, second, to regulate an activity (such
as hunting) over the entirety (or bulk) of its territory. How might Canadian law
approach claims of these kinds?
We have already seen that precedent does not seem capable of satisfactorily
approaching the sorts of political matters that arise when we think through the
local/larger dimension of the problem of proper rights-holders in the context of
taking seriously Indigenous self-determination. What of the ability of precedents
to satisfactorily account for Indigenous self-determination when we turn to
thinking directly of such matters, of the larger Indigenous collective making
arguments about rights that bring in matters of regulating conduct? It is tempting
to focus on the weaker claim that the larger community has the right to regulate
how its subunits and members hunt in the larger territory. However, given
common understandings of stewardship and responsibilities to lands and waters,
it is quite likely that this power vis-à-vis members is often seen from an Indigenous
perspective as simply an instance of the exercise of the stronger right (to regulate
activities on traditional territory simpliciter, regardless of parties being regulated).
28. Note, this could well have been the situation in Bernard, if a local Mi’kmaq community had
felt it needed to protect its local hunting practices from intruders.
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We focus, then, on the stronger claim, working our way through an overview of
the likely treatment of such claims by Canadian jurisprudence.
Te frst challenge would be in meeting basic requirements set out in Van
der Peet and elaborated upon in Sappier.29 Would it be possible to build a case
that at contact it was integral to the distinctive culture of the larger Indigenous
community that it regulated conduct on its territory? Tere are several matters
that cast this into doubt.30
Our one guide in this matter comes from R v Pamajewon, the only case
that has directly engaged with a claimed right to regulate (described as a right to
self-govern). In this case several First Nations attempted to defend the existence
of provincially non-licensed bingo halls on their reserves by arguing they were
exercising either an inherent right to self-govern or a right to self-regulate
economic activities (or, a right to determine uses of reserve lands).31 In applying
Van der Peet to these sorts of claimed rights the Court reiterated what it had
said in that earlier case about how Aboriginal rights must be narrowly defned—
broad assertions of rights to govern and the like will be pared down by Canadian
courts to more manageable claims tied to specifc activities. In Pamajewon, the
principal way of doing this was to address how the specifc activity interacts
with government law and regulation. Te Court, bringing into the business of
29. Supra note 7 and R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 [Sappier].
30. See Van der Peet, supra note 7 at para 53. One concern is the matter of characterization or
defnition. I do not focus on this in the text, as it is not clear the approach the Supreme
Court laid out has to be followed for claims that do not inherently exist in tension with
Crown regulation. Te Court in Van der Peet held that the right today is to be defned by
thinking about three things—the nature of the practice, custom or tradition at contact,
the nature of the activity engaged in today said to refect that practice, custom or tradition,
and the government regulation the present activity has impugned. Leaving aside the remote
possibility of an action seeking a declaration, litigation almost always involves attempts on
the part of an Aboriginal community to raise the defense of the exercise of an Aboriginal
right (where the community is represented by the individual(s) facing state sanction for
example, a charge following hunting in an area where authorities of the state hold hunting
is not permitted). Tere would be, then, an impugned government regulation impacting on
how this claimed right would be defned. How, then, would the matter of characterization
work out? In the situation we are contemplating the impugned government regulation
would be directed toward—and seemingly in confict with—the very thing claimed to be a
right, as the larger community and the state both assert the authority to determine how an
activity is to be properly carried out in an area. But when we think of the activity at contact,
we do not seem required to somehow picture this today interfacing with Crown regulation—
the whole matter seems designed to ft with cases where in today’s world an Aboriginal
people run afoul of Crown legislation, and yet that seems an improper way to set up a test to
determine how claims get translated into rights.
31. [1996] 2 SCR 821.
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defning the right the way gambling was regulated by the province, characterized
the right as “the right to participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling
activities on the reservation [sic].”32 Once characterized that way it was entirely
unsurprising that no such right was found. For our purposes, the key takeaway
is this reinforced requirement that the regulatory power be (somehow) framed in
terms of specifc activities.
On a conceptual level framing in this manner seems like an impossible task.
It is not just that the regulatory conduct be directed toward specifc activities,
but that the right to regulate itself be nothing more than an activity. Given that
the right is by defnition more of a power than a right, it is hard to see how it
could be conceived of in a way that it fts within these narrow confnes. Let us
leave this aside and press on, imagining that somehow something like a “right to
regulate the practice of hunting over the territory of x” could be set out in a form
with enough specifcity such that the existence of this right was then at least a
possibility to explore.
Bear in mind that how the right has been narrowed to an activity quite likely
already leaves behind Indigenous self-determination—this narrowly-focused
“right” would seem but an inefectual shadow of the matter Indigenous
communities would want to be pressing, namely a broad right to actively manage
their lands and waters. We fnd ourselves now at a stage of analysis lying in between
the matter of characterization and the business of showing the right. We frst
need to grapple with the fact the Supreme Court held that this test is focused
on narrowly-defned practices, customs, and traditions that evince something
known as “Aboriginality”—that is, on activities with which the community
engaged in a particularly “Aboriginal” manner (in Sappier for example, the act of
harvesting and using wood had to be found to evince a particular Mi’kmaq way
of doing so—Aboriginal rights, the Court held in Van der Peet, exist to protect
“Aboriginality”33). How would a community go about showing it was integral to
its Aboriginal culture that it regulated certain activities?
We already noted that having the right be essentially an activity functions
to move the claimed right away from Indigenous self-determination. Te only
avenue open by way of salvage would be to try to ft the claim into this requirement
by narrowing focus to the act of regulation itself. Perhaps this might work as well
when we focus on this requirement of “Aboriginality.” It might seem possible
that many Aboriginal communities would be able to argue it has always been an

32. Ibid at para 26.
33. See Sappier, supra note 29 at paras 42-45.
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important part of their cultural ways of living to regulate certain activities (for
example, objectives of stewardship, common across Indigenous communities).
Even if we skip past this problem, assuming the activity of regulating enfolds
within it or presupposes a power, in what way must an Aboriginal community,
then, build an argument and muster evidence? How does it show that at contact
the power of regulating activities on its land was integral to its distinct culture and
of a nature that it is peculiarly “Aboriginal”? Te larger Indigenous community
would need to show not just that act(s) of regulating were integral to its distinctive
culture, but that this all is, somehow, a culturally circumscribed matter. Te
Mi’kmaq, for example, would have needed to show in Bernard that the acts of
regulating hunting amongst its members and subunits was something that was
peculiarly Mi’kmaq-ian (and, on the other side of this coin, not something that
now refects too deeply a “European” infuence34).
All this goes to show how challenging it would be—and what severe
modifcations an Indigenous community would need to make—to meet the
requirements of the Van der Peet test in relation to strong claims to regulate or
control conduct over Indigenous lands and waters. We end this overview, however,
with yet one more problem that arises, as this last matter brings us even more
directly face-to-face with the interface between Indigenous self-determination
and questions about proper rights-holders in the area of claims of site-specifc
Aboriginal rights. Should it be possible to make sensible arguments within the
Canadian context about rights to regulate certain activities, questions also arise
concerning continuity.
We began our examination into the proper rights-holder question with the
notion that a key distinction is between local and larger-scale communities,
but the discussion in the last few pages has shown that this can be a secondary
matter, as when we look to the larger community other questions intrude. Te
requirement of continuity brings these questions to the surface, as we ask about
the nature of the larger community today, the nature of the corresponding
community at contact, and the history that links these two. Earlier we noted that
it seems Canadian courts are likely to presume larger communities are defned by
shared language and customs, a delineation which limits their nature to essentially
socio-cultural bodies. However, for these bodies to have historically regulated
conduct on the larger traditional territory requires that they be more than
culturally bounded—they have to be acknowledged to be socio-political bodies.
Once we invite in the notion of socio-political bodies at contact and trace
their continuity with bodies that exist today which might make claims about
34. Supra note 15.
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present-day regulatory powers, we come squarely face-to-face with the history
of colonial law and policy. Tere are larger bodies today that are essentially
amalgamations of Crown-generated First Nations, but there are also those
politically-charged bodies that correspond—given generations of evolution—to
Indigenous polities at contact.35 For the most part it is these bodies who will
struggle to overcome the requirement of continuity within the Van der Peet test,
since it is these bodies whose authority has been consistently—and, during the
darkest period of colonialism in Canada, violently—attacked by both federal
and provincial Crowns. Are they not, however, the proper rights-holders, should
regulatory powers somehow be translated into rights?
We could go further into our examination into how existing jurisprudence
under the Van der Peet umbrella would likely treat claims to regulate made by
larger Indigenous communities. Te remaining points of discussion also come
up should we try to deal with the difcult matters we have come across so far
by imagining the tight strictures of the Van der Peet test could be loosened in
the context of claims to Aboriginal governance. What we have determined to
this point is that much of what needs to be worked out, should Van der Peet
rule, is untested and that much of what would need to be addressed is such that
existing jurisprudence ofers little concrete guidance.

V. WORKING WITH BROADER FORMS OF SECTION 35
RIGHTS
One way around these problems would be to imagine that Canadian law is more
robust than we have allowed to this point in the analysis, that it has room within
its current boundaries for rights that do not necessarily have to meet the restrictive
requirements set out in the Van der Peet test. We test this by keeping our eyes on
the very sort of right at issue in the preceding discussion, a right held by the larger
Indigenous community to regulate an activity in relation to its territory, as well
as opportunities that might exist to fnd a right protected by section 35 but not
limited to the confnes of Van der Peet.
Indications that there may be other paths forward come from related areas
of law, like the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw the Supreme
Court struggled with ftting what it felt they needed to say about title into the
35. Tere are numerous examples across Canada of these bodies continuing to act as legal and
political authorities, including that of the Mi’kmaq confederacy discussed indirectly in
Bernard. See, for example, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, and the hereditary systems of
the Gitxsan and the Wet’suwet’en.
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narrow confnes of Van der Peet.36 In essence, the Court skirted the matter, simply
asserting that it seems indisputable that an Aboriginal community’s interests in
their lands would be of central signifcance to the culture of the claimants, and
that this satisfes the requirements of the land being integral to the distinctive
culture of the title-holders.37
How, then, might a right to regulate be understood and framed within the
larger umbrella of existing case law? Tere are two dimensions to explore: First,
we can ask about what restrictions imposed by the Van der Peet test might be
malleable (or capable of being removed), while, second, we can ask about what
could be added in this context.
We saw above that Delgamuukw speaks to the ability of the common law
to lift one major restriction, namely that claimed rights all be tightly tied to
particular practices, customs and traditions. In shifting attention away from this
requirement, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal title protects more than
just those specifc practices, customs and traditions of central signifcance to the
distinctive culture of the title-holder. Terefore, we can well imagine that a right
to regulate or govern protects more than specifc practices, customs and traditions
that might have been regulated or controlled historically by this communal
power. Just as title, while itself an Aboriginal right, is found to not have as its
essence that it merely protects specifc practices, customs and traditions, so too
would the right to regulate, while itself an Aboriginal right, not be found, as its
essence, to merely act to regulate specifc practices, customs and traditions (that
themselves could all meet the Van der Peet test).
Tis plays out interestingly in the governance context. One could well
imagine, for example, a narrower understanding of governance, worked so that
36. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 151. Tis is required given the architecture of the
jurisprudence, with Aboriginal title held to be one form of an Aboriginal right, itself required
given the fact section 35 only recognizes and acknowledges Aboriginal (and treaty) rights. See
R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101.
37. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 151. Te Court said there:
Although [the requirement that the right be “integral” and of central “signifcance” to the
culture of the claimant] remains a crucial part of the test for aboriginal rights, given the
occupancy requirement in the test for aboriginal title, I cannot imagine a situation where this
requirement would actually serve to limit or preclude a title claim. Te requirement exists for
rights short of title because it is necessary to distinguish between those practices which were
central to the culture of claimants and those which were more incidental. However, in the
case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which
the parties have maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufciently important
to be of central signifcance to the culture of the claimants. As a result, I do not think it is
necessary to include explicitly this element as part of the test for aboriginal title.
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it might ft within the strictures of the Van der Peet test, such that it really only
speaks to patterns of regulation that existed at contact (ftting the requirement of
rights protecting only specifc activities). A court tasked with acknowledging this
narrow right would then be looking into particularized patterns of regulation
at contact (such as specifc forms of regulation of “high stakes gambling,”
or specifc forms of land use regulation). So, for example, a court would then be
asking an Aboriginal community: how, at contact, were your determinations who
could hunt where laid out on the landscape? Once this was set, the right today
would have to mirror these practices, customs and traditions, acting to protect
these patterns of activity (for example, this clan was held to have these abilities to
do these activities in relation to these pieces of land, et cetera).
A broader form of governance, on the other hand, would escape this
particular constraint of Van der Peet (and so, overrule Pamajewon). Te most
natural way to do this would be to acknowledge what seems already entirely
sensible, that rights to governance must attach to powers.38 Much as the test from
Delgamuukw requires that a title-claimant show such things as possession and
sufcient occupation, a test for rights to governance would require a claimant
to show matters that illustrate the presence of a power to determine how lands
and waters are approached by humans (that is, governing capacities, manifest in
patterns of group-life attuned with determinations concerning how people should
act). We return to this matter later, as it opens the door to the key underlying
discussion in this context, the threat that Canadian law might follow this line
of reasoning too far, imposing normative requirements on how such governing
capacities actually do function in the world.
On, then, to what we might hope could be added to this form of an
Aboriginal right, once again keeping ourselves as best possible within the limits
of existing Canadian jurisprudence. Once again, Delgamuukw can be our guide.
Besides the obvious thought that a robust right to governance would enhance
the decision-making powers of the rights-holder, we might also hope such a right
would have an inescapable economic component, and be said to arise in Canadian
law at the assertion (or, better still, the efective exercise) of Crown sovereignty.39
All three of these make sense as elements of a more robust Aboriginal right
to governance, but questions naturally arise. One might wonder, for example,
about the extent to which these separate elements could come into the content

38. Tis would be akin to the fact that in Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title was found to be a
property right, a right to land itself and not simply a bundle of site-specifc Aboriginal rights.
39. Delgamuukw, supra note 8 at para 166.
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of the right.40 Would decision making extend to something like jurisdictional
authority?41 Could such authority extend not only to the activities of the members
of the Aboriginal community holding the right, but also to all those engaged in
activity on the lands and waters in question? Would we expect the economic
component to be bounded, particularly in how it played out in relation to
non-Aboriginal interests?42 How would the presumed sovereignty of the Crown
40. Te question of timing is somewhat distinct, as one would expect a struggle around
whether it makes sense to ground the right at the point of contact (in any particular place),
or on the assertion/exercise of Crown sovereignty. It might seem to make more sense to
focus on Crown sovereignty since, as with Aboriginal title, one could argue the right arises,
as something to be integrated with Crown sovereignty, at the point Crown sovereignty
comes into being. But, to shift the time-frame—as much as that might make sense—would
seemingly radically alter what has been a relatively fxed framework in place for several
decades. Back on the other side of the ledger, however, is the fact that the Court already
made this sort of shift in relation to Métis rights (the result being the odd fact that one people
under section 35 show their rights came into being at the point the Crown exercised “efective
control” in an area, while the other two peoples have to go further back, to the point of contact
with Europeans). See Powley, supra note 21 for this shift in relation to Métis rights.
41. See e.g. Gordon Christie, “Who Makes Decisions over Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 48
UBC L Rev 743 (exploring these questions in the context of Aboriginal title).
42. To the extent a right to governance functioned to facilitate the growth of Aboriginal
economies such things as “wealth-creation” could potentially fall outside its scope. One
might reasonably expect the Supreme Court to limit governance rights to matters that enable
the Aboriginal community to maintain a sustainable economy, one that generates something
akin to “moderate livelihoods” for community members, following cases like R v Gladstone
[1996] 2 SCR 723 [Gladstone] and Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC
56. In Lax Kw’alaams, Justice Binnie held that:
in the event that an Aboriginal right to trade commercially is found to exist, the court, when
delineating such a right should have regard to what was said by Chief Justice Lamer in Gladstone
(albeit in the context of a Sparrow justifcation), as follows:
Although by no means making a defnitive statement on this issue, I would suggest that with
regards to the distribution of the fsheries resource after conservation goals have been met,
objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the
historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fshery by non-aboriginal groups, are the
type of objectives which can (at least in the right circumstances) satisfy this standard. In the
right circumstances, such objectives are in the interest of all Canadians and, more importantly,
the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the rest of Canadian society may well depend
on their successful attainment. (Ibid at paras 46, quoting Gladstone, supra para 75 [frst
emphasis added].)

On the other side of things, an Aboriginal right to govern could also threaten to impede
the possibilities of economic activities by others, functioning to put the brakes on exploitive
industries. One might suspect that Canadian law might develop mechanisms within the right
that limit its ability to be disruptive in this manner.
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afect both the decision-making component of the right and the ability of the
Crown of justifably limit its exercise?
We do not need to get bogged down in details and arguments around these
matters at this point. It is sufcient to note that at this point, precedents do not
provide nearly enough guidance to know how these sorts of questions would play
out in Canadian jurisprudence. Instead, the notion of going beyond the Van der
Peet test reveals two other matters that require exploration at this juncture.
First, arguments about sovereign incompatibility are likely to arise at
this point, as the Crown would almost certainly argue that specifc forms of
the Aboriginal right to governance could not survive the assertion of Crown
sovereignty (with some forms at most now merged into Crown sovereignty),
while, second, concerns about the racist core of Canadian jurisprudence may
well (fnally) have to be introduced and addressed, since at some point it seems
the jurisprudence would need to take heed of underlying arguments about the
nature of the political organization of Indigenous collectives, arguments that are
likely to percolate up through the analysis.
We can leave sovereign incompatibility to one side in this discussion—while
the doctrine is relatively settled in Canadian law, its application has not been
discussed in any great detail by a court.43 We can say that it is relatively certain
that particular claims to governance will be found to confict with the presence
and exercise of Crown sovereignty, and other claims will most likely have no
interaction with this doctrine; however, where things stand in the middle is
unclear and unsettled.
Te racism at the core of Canadian law is another matter. It is rarely touched
upon by Canadian courts, though it is clear the Supreme Court is aware of the
historical presence of a deep-seated set of racist beliefs that drove the common
law for generations.44 Te challenge has to do with persisting forms of racism,
43. Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33.
44. Te Court noted as such in both Sparrow, supra note 9 and Van der Peet, supra note 7.
In Sparrow, for example, the Court stated that “[o]ur history has shown, unfortunately all too
well, that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are justifed in worrying about government objectives
that may be superfcially neutral but which constitute de facto threats to the existence of
aboriginal rights and interests” (ibid at 1110). See also where the Court noted that:
Te policy of negotiating treaties with the aboriginals was never formally abandoned. It was
simply overridden, as the settlers, aided by administrations more concerned for shortterm
solutions than the duty of the Crown toward the frst peoples of the colony settled where
they wished and allocated to the aboriginals what they deemed appropriate. Tis did not
prevent the aboriginal peoples of British Columbia from persistently asserting their right to an
honourable settlement of their ancestral rights—a settlement which most of them still await
(Van der Peet, supra note 7 at 273).
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forms that lie hidden but often determinative within the core of section 35
jurisprudence. We can see where they are likely to foat closer to the surface,
potentially to the point where they become obvious to any attentive observer,
when we think of the notion that an Indigenous collective, one that regulated
various activities on its traditional territory at contact with Europeans, might be
able make a claim (under this stronger form of section 35 right) to regulate these
activities in the present. When we juxtapose such a situation with what eventuated
in the release of Delgamuukw we can see how matters might become interesting.
We noted earlier that Delgamuukw can lead the way to the development
of a more robust form of an Aboriginal right to governance, as the Court there
veered away from strict adherence to the confning test laid out in Van der Peet.
Te problem the Court faced with claims to Aboriginal title was that even
within the usual sorts of arguments at play within the common law, Aboriginal
peoples had more than mere use-rights in relation to their lands. It was, quite
simply, racist to continue to hold that the most Aboriginal peoples could claim
within the common law were rights to use lands in certain ways, as they clearly
met basic indicia required to be property holders (as they had been arguing for
many generations). Te solution, recall, was to side-step Van der Peet, developing
instead a more robust notion of Aboriginal property interests.
A similar move to a more robust form of a right to Aboriginal governance can
track the same sorts of sentiments. At present, the Court faces claims to Aboriginal
governance that should amount to valid claims by Indigenous collectives to be
considered a source of authoritative determinations concerning how activities will
be carried out in their traditional territories. In order to parallel developments
leading to Delgamuukw we would here have to rise above the common law (as it
has little conceptual space for notions of such things as independent jurisdictional
authority potentially grounding claims by peoples within the state) and focus
instead on the state of international law. Within modern forms of international
law Indigenous peoples enjoy rights to self-determination that speak to powers
akin to jurisdictional authority. Unless one clings to nineteenth century racist
notions about who can be said ft to govern, how can it not be the case that
Indigenous traditionally-grounded collectives enjoy these rights? Without
clinging to racist beliefs (that Indigenous peoples were not and are not sufciently
advanced, or that their systems of governance are products of unenlightened,
uncivilized associations of people), how can courts in Canada continue to block
the development of robust “rights” to governance?
All this, however, is just to point to how immensely unsettled the law is
around rights to govern and/or regulate. When we unpack the issue of who the
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proper rights-holder may be in certain disputes, we come up against the need
to work out how fairly straightforward rights to engage in certain activities in
certain places interacts with other rights that can be claimed, where these other
rights enfold within themselves site-specifc, activity-focused rights. Whether we
try to untangle this with Van der Peet-centered mechanisms or stretch section 35
jurisprudence to imagine a robust form of an Aboriginal right to governance,
we fnd that the jurisprudence leaves many serious questions unanswered. At this
point, our only hope within Canadian law is to begin working out how the
Supreme Court has generally approached matters under section 35.

VI. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S PRINCIPLED
APPROACH
With gaps and novel problems plaguing domestic Canadian law as it might apply
to questions concerning proper rights-holders we turn to how deeper elements of
the law informing its structure might be used to address these matters. Behind
rules and tests developed in the jurisprudence over the last three decades, one can
detect sets of principles and values that drive the law as it incrementally changes
over time. Here, we ask about what animates the Court’s approach to issues that
arise within the general feld of Aboriginal rights. With this in hand, we can then
reasonably expect that the Court would apply this general approach to these
specifc unresolved matters, if and when they are brought before it.
Time and space limitations restrict the degree of analysis with which
we can engage. To tighten things up I propose to work with a postulation in
hand, though one with a fair degree of exegetical support that can be found in
the jurisprudence. Tis assumption is that the Supreme Court has developed
jurisprudence on section 35 that fts with its general approach to all matters related
to rights, an approach that refects Canada’s status as a liberal democracy. In the
context of the recognition and afrmation of Aboriginal rights, this manifests as
a project of translating all Indigenous claims into Aboriginal group rights. Tis is
done in a manner that does not unduly stretch or break the conceptual limits on
how peoples of liberal democracy are understood to live and prosper together in
a multicultural setting.45
We can track how this approach emerged onto the legal landscape in the
narrower context of section 35. Te Court faced a clear choice in Sparrow:
To directly address Canada’s colonial history, or to attempt to tame Indigenous
45. I discuss this more in detail in Christie, supra note 11.
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activism through the promise of the enhancement of rights.46 Te Court chose
the latter, signalled by its invocation of the sanctity of Crown sovereignty.47 How
it would accomplish the task it now set itself—the taming of Indigenous claims
within the apparatus of the state—was determined by and large in Van der Peet.
Tere the Court held that all Aboriginal claims would be treated as framing special
kinds of rights, those that protect “Aboriginality.”48 Tis, in turn, was understood
in fundamentally cultural terms, such that Aboriginal communities could argue
that aspects of their cultures were due recognition and protection from Crown
interference. How Crown interference that was allowable (justifable) was
to be assessed and managed had been set out in Sparrow, with that structure
modifed in Gladstone.49
Tis all fts with a more general principled approach to the matter of group
rights in a liberal democracy. One might (somewhat crudely) say liberalism grew
in power and reach over the last few centuries as a doctrine that elevated the
individual, focusing attention on matters of autonomy, reason, and the will.50
Pushing back in the Western world against systems of authority and oppression
that had traditionally constrained the liberty and dignity of the individual,
liberalism ofered ways of structuring the larger elements of society so that
individuals could direct their own lives, and thereby (within the normative vision
propounded by liberalism) have the highest likelihood of fourishing.51
Te history of the rise of classical liberalism is also intertwined, however,
with a historical concern with the persecution of certain groups, tied to religious

46. Where, indeed, some sort of rights (particularly those relating to property) should have been
protected all along, should Indigenous peoples have been treated as full citizens of Canada
from its earliest instantiations.
47. Sparrow, supra note 9 at 1103.
48. Van der Peet, supra note 7 at paras 20, 44.
49. Sparrow, supra note 9 at 1109-11; Gladstone, supra note 42.
50. See for example, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford University
Press, 1989); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1958); Andrea
T Baumeister, Liberalism and the “Politics of Diference” (Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
51. See Jasnet Ajzenstat & Peter J Smith, eds, Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican?
(Carleton University Press, 1995). Te authors developed arguments and explored the forces
at play in struggles over Canada’s identity and future in the nineteenth and frst half of the
twentieth century. Was liberalism in Canada attacked principally from the right (with attacks
by conservatives) or was there also a struggle with a vision of civic republicanism coming
from the left? See also, Jean-François Constant & Michel Ducharme, eds, Liberalism and
Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution (University of Toronto Press, 2009).
Here we fnd a focus on more recent Canadian history, and on the centrality of liberal
doctrine to the development of contemporary Canadian identity and attendant institutions.
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diferences.52 A solution crafted in the early centuries of liberalism’s emergence
was to foreground tolerance, such that collectives tied to religious groundings
could both enjoy a certain degree of protection from state interference and be
relatively secure against one another.53 Te attempt was to build societal structures
and institutions that made it possible, for example, for Roman Catholics to live
in the same state as Protestants, both relatively secure in the knowledge the state
would not treat one or the other preferentially and would not pursue (or allow to
be pursued) programs of persecution.
By the late twentieth century, much of this, within liberal doctrine, would
spin around the notion of identity through acknowledgment of the force of
identity in each person’s life and life-plan. Liberalism speaks to the sense that
each person—enjoying a degree of equality with each other person in a state–
should be able to choose his or her own way of living his or her life. Ultimately,
who one imagines oneself to be, how one in efect becomes a self, is a matter
of individual craft, as we each function to build who we are in a project all
our own. Liberalism also fnds space, however, for the protection of groups to
which individuals belong, as groups function to provide meaning for the lives of
their members, to give individuals possible forms of identity, to do much of the
work of ground-level identity construction that individuals can then respond to
and work within.
One can see, however, a tension that runs through this model of how the
state should be structured. On the one hand, the modern liberal state has evolved
so that forms of group living, tied to forms of group identity, are tolerated, such
that a certain degree of group autonomy is protected. Spheres of group life,
originally those of religious life but subsequently expanded, are expected to enjoy
such autonomy as they need to allow those within the group to continue to see
themselves as (at least partially) constituted as the persons they are as members of
this group. But, on the other hand, the origins of liberalism itself lay in a reaction
against control of the individual by various collectives or larger societal structures
(historically the Church and entrenched aristocracies). Te limits of toleration

52. William A Galston, Te Practice of Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
53. See Rainer Forst, “Toleration” in Edward N Zalta, ed, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(23 February 2007), online: <plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration> [perma.cc/CAP4-EXAJ].
Te entry on toleration provides a good overview of diferent theories of toleration, and in
the middle and later sections looks at how some of the theories emerged from religious strife
in Europe from the sixteenth century onward.
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are approached when a group to which the state is expected to be tolerant is
perceived to unduly limit the autonomy of its members.54
In Van der Peet and Sappier,55 we see this model applied to Aboriginal rights.
Tese rights are said to exist and function to protect distinct ways of living tied
to matters of identity. Ways of living that are distinctly “Aboriginal,” that refect
collective choice to believe in certain values and ideals, to live in certain ways,
to act in certain ways, are to be “recognized and afrmed” within the larger liberal
state within which Indigenous peoples now fnd themselves. But, as with matters
in a liberal democracy more generally, tension arises that must be managed,
as Aboriginal collectives are accorded a degree of protection from state activity
but viewed suspiciously in relation to the possible role any particular collective
may play in unduly restricting or interfering with individual autonomy and so
the fourishing of its members.
On the battlefeld of social philosophy original lines of struggle between
liberals and conservatives marked disagreement between those with deep concerns
about conserving certain collectively-defned traditional values, beliefs, and ways
of living and those who found fundamental value in according the individual the
freedom to question and, if so choosing, to leave such traditions behind. Within
the liberal world the thought will be that in protecting traditional ways of living
of Aboriginal peoples (tied to matters of identity and, in some sense, chosen)
Aboriginal rights must be nevertheless carefully controlled by the state, as they
refect ways of living at contact generated by liberal societies, the constant threat
being, then, that they might function today to restrict or oppress members of
Aboriginal collectives.
Furthermore—and crucially important in the context of both settler–
Indigenous (societal) relations and Crown–Indigenous (political) relations—all
of this is presumed to occur and exist within a single socio-political setting. Tat
is, the liberal state is presumed to be the sole source of political and legal authority,
vested with the task of working out how socio-culturally determined “Aboriginal
peoples” are to be worked into the state, just as the liberal democratic society of
Canada is presumed to set the normative limits of understanding regarding how
Aboriginal peoples can conceive of themselves living and functioning in a single,
given social world.

54. Both Galston and Kymlicka delve into where the limits might be in multicultural societies.
See Galston, supra note 52 and Kymlicka, supra note 50. As well, Berlin provides one of the
clearest articulations of the dangers of toleration. See Berlin, supra note 50.
55. Van der Peet, supra note 7; Sappier, supra note 29.
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It is essential, then, that we bear in mind the larger vision of society within
which the tension we are describing is embedded. Te vision is of Aboriginal
peoples as already enfolded within the one unitary polity, that of the liberal state,
such that whatever their interests, values, beliefs or ways of living might be, they
are all (both the peoples and their values, beliefs, et cetera) contained as material
to be controlled by the larger liberal societal structures of this one polity (such
as legislatures and judicial systems). Note one vitally important implication of
this picture—there is no room whatsoever in this model for the sense that any
Indigenous collective could have any right to make decisions about how others
outside this collective could live (where this right might manifest either as specifc
decisions impacting on how others act in certain situations or as societal structures
that then go about making decisions about how others might act).
Tis all, then, points to how we can reasonably expect the Supreme Court
to deal with the sorts of questions that arose when we looked at existing
precedent. We begin with the scenario in which questions around who the proper
rights-holder might be as contained within the integral-to-the-distinctive-culture
framework. Tis framework, we can now appreciate, was created to manage and
limit Indigenous claims within the setting of a multicultural liberal democracy.
Te value of culture, within such a model, is value to individuals. While
Aboriginal cultural structures and beliefs are protected, this measure of toleration
is always subject to oversight, as the larger vision is of sets of culturally-bounded
First Peoples whose ways of living need to be reconciled to the rest of Canadian
society. To the extent these ways of living can ft within the one multicultural
society that is Canada, they can be “recognized and afrmed,” but they do not
reach out beyond being essentially cultural matters. Tat is, there can be no sense
allowed that Aboriginal collectives can carve out worlds of legal and political
authority within Canada that exist alongside the larger liberal state.
Faced with a dispute in which it might seem that both a local Aboriginal
community is a proper rights-holder and that the larger Indigenous community
(within which the smaller community has been historically embedded) can also
make sensible claims to Aboriginal rights to regulate activities, we can reasonably
expect the Supreme Court to refocus attention on the fact that Aboriginal
rights are all culturally-grounded. Let us imagine a specifc sort of dispute (not
patterned on Bernard, but loosely similar): An Aboriginal individual has been
charged with hunting in a place claimed by a local Aboriginal community to
be an area over which only they have an Aboriginal right to hunt, where this
individual is not a member of this local community. Te individual, however,
is a member of the larger Indigenous collective of which this local community
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has traditionally been a part, and in which the larger community itself claims an
Aboriginal right to determine how both its individual members and its subunits
hunt within the larger traditional territory. Tis may be part of a stronger claim
to be able to regulate this activity simpliciter on their territories. Presumably,
within the world of Canadian law bounded by Van der Peet, the outcome would
depend on the evidence that could be tendered to show, in either case, whether it
was (and continues to be) integral to the distinctive culture of the two diferent
Aboriginal communities that they engage in the relevant activity (a “practice,
custom, or tradition”).56
Bearing in mind the principled approach underlying the jurisprudence, we can
see, however, that the claim of the larger community would face particular—
indeed, seemingly insurmountable—challenges. Whether an Aboriginal right to
regulate is narrowly construed (as only capturing particular patterns of regulated
activity) or more broadly defned (as a power to made determinations, whatever
they might be), this right only exists to protect peculiarly Aboriginal activities.
Further, digging down a bit more into the thinking behind this, the right only
receives protection as a source of meaning for the individuals making up the larger
group. When a Canadian court looks, then, at the larger collective it asks how the
practice, custom, or tradition under investigation might enhance the identity of
members of the group. When the activity in question runs up into state sanction
a court will ask about whether state interference with the workings of the group
(on its social institutions) impacts negatively on the ability of group members to
continue to draw meaning as members of this group (as, for example, a Mi’kmaw,
and not—as in Bernard—a member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation).
Tis points to the positive weight Canadian law might accord the activity
in question (entirely grounded in the meaning it provides individuals), and it
is unclear how much this might amount to. Consider the kind of claim Mr.
Bernard wished to pursue at the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick: To what
extent could the Mi’kmaq nation show it was and is central to their being as an
Aboriginal collective that they engage in this specifc sort of activity (an activity
that must be identifed as peculiarly Mi’kmaq-ian)? While undoubtedly there will
be many Aboriginal communities who would argue that it is not just important
but essential that they (the larger Indigenous collective) managed and continue
to manage activities on their lands and waters, this is not how Canadian law
determines the weight it accords such activities. It looks at the matter essentially
divorced from the signifcance an Aboriginal group might attach to an activity,
asking instead in an objective sense how central to the way of living of the
56. Van der Peet, supra note 7.
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group—as a peculiarly Aboriginal way of living—the activity might have been
and continue to be.57 Tis objective determination then purportedly measures,
indirectly, the value to individuals making up the collective. It is this latter value
that ultimately a Canadian court would have its eyes upon.
On the negative side of the ledger matters become a bit clearer, but also
much more troubling for the prospects of Indigenous self-determination. Even
within the weaker form of the right we fnd practices, customs, or traditions that
are instances of a collective determining how it manages the lives of individuals
who make it up. Recall that within a multicultural liberal democracy it is these
very matters that attract the scrutiny of state institutions. Te limits of toleration
lie in this region, and once crossed they require state action to protect the only
interests that actually have value within a liberal social-polity, the interests of
individuals. Te activity of regulation at contact, note, would have taken place
within an aliberal social environment, and so would be immediately suspect.
To the extent the practice today continued to focus on the ability of the group
to regulate the activity, regardless of the rights of the individuals making up the
group, the greater the suspicion would grow.
Meanwhile, the stronger form of the right would encompass practices,
customs and traditions that speak to control over how all who might interact
with their territory do so. Here we fnd a disconnect between the grounding for
rights under the Van der Peet test and the sort of claim being imagined. Tere are
at least two points of disconnect. First, it is difcult to see how an Indigenous
collective could argue that it is integral to their distinctive culture that they
determine how others interact with lands to which they have connections.
Second, all rights to governance under this test must still be essentially cultural
in nature, their value lying in the contribution they might make to the meaning
and identity individuals vest in their self-driven lives. We are imagining, however,
a practice, custom, or tradition that reaches out into the lives of those who are
not members of this collective. Together these matters point to the difculty,
if not impossibility, in seeing how rights grounded in this manner could include
within them an ability to dictate how those outside the collective in question plan
and live their lives. Beyond these problems with how the test functions, however,
we fnd a further impediment. We noted earlier, as an implication of the model of
rights underlying this principled approach, a seemingly insurmountable barrier,
as the stronger form of right is not sensible within the liberal model of rights of
cultural groups.
57. Ibid at para 52.
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Let us move on, then, to the prospect of a more robust Aboriginal right
to governance, one not tied to the strict requirements of the Van der Peet test.
Here we imagine this right being essentially a power, where the claimant must
demonstrate an ability to authoritatively determine how humans approach lands
and waters on their territory. Unfortunately, as we noted in our introduction to
this robust right, while precedent suggests it might be possible for Canadian law
to fnd space, it is both unlikely to come into being and, if it were to appear,
serious questions arise around how it would be defned and controlled by the state
and its courts. Still, assuming it might come into being, how might we expect
Canadian courts to answer some of the questions that would arise around it?
Te most serious matter, of course, would have to do with the extent of
the right and just how robust it might be. Here we focus on two dimensions:
First, how much decision-making authority it might encompass (could it, for
example, rise to a level commensurate with law-making, being, in essence, a right
to jurisdictional authority?) and second, whether it could extend out over lands
and waters and not just peoples (could it be a power in relation to a territory and
not limited to power in relation to the members of the collective?).
Te only way into such a right is through recognition on the part of
Canadian courts that it is simply so within the world we all co-inhabit that
Indigenous collectives within the larger Canadian society have the power to
make determinations about how they live and act (about, that is, how members
of each collective live and act). Canadian law would, in efect, have to align
itself with international law. However, as we noted in the discussion of a Van
der Peet-enclosed right of this kind, the focus on cultural bases for Aboriginal
rights makes it seem impossible for such a right to extend out past the collective’s
members to others. When we turn to the more robust right, having the right not
limited to grounding in cultural practices, we might think it possible to imagine
this extended reach could be part of its nature, but the deeper approach taken
by the Supreme Court—having Aboriginal rights ft with liberal sensibilities in a
liberal democracy—pushes back against this possibility.
Tere are two sides to this: on the one hand, the principled approach blocks
certain matters, as it is based on reasons and arguments that speak to what is
unacceptable, or even not sensible, within the liberal world of normativity and
governance. On the other hand, it also advances certain matters, setting out how
certain issues should be, and will be, both understood and dealt with.
On the frst front, Canadian courts cannot countenance the emergence of
Aboriginal rights that bring into the landscape robust Indigenous socio-political
bodies. Canadian social institutions are built on liberal architectural principles
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and ideals, built so that as much as possible free and equal individuals can
determine how to live their lives,58 and can then freely and equally pursue
lives thereby imagined. Indigenous socio-political bodies do not just introduce
potential challenges to this unitary system, but also make possible other forms of
social structure, built on other visions of what society is and can be.
What is possible, then, are forms of Indigenous legal and political authority
that can be carefully circumscribed within the liberal state. What is possible is a
world in which liberal institutions of the state make all determinations about what
activities on Indigenous territories will be forbidden, countenanced or promoted,
where Indigenous legal and political authorities are able to have an advisory voice
in matters of deliberations. Tis is the model of Indigenous self-determination
being constructed all around us in the modern Canadian context.

VII.CONCLUSION
Where, then, do we fnd ourselves at this point in our analysis and discussion?
We saw that there are numerous serious matters Canadian courts have not
spoken to, which required that we consider how the underlying nature of existing
jurisprudence might eventuate in resolutions to the questions we developed.
We now see, however, that the jurisprudence is built on a set of principles and
values that are meant to continue to push how Canada relates to Indigenous
peoples away from any substantive engagement with matters of Indigenous
self-determination. Should Indigenous communities accept and learn to live
with the strong likelihood that Canadian law will at most allow for domesticated
rights to say such things as “these members can engage in this activity in this
place,” where constant state oversight and control further tame the powers of
these communities?
Trough the stages of analysis, we kept an eye on a deeper struggle that
questions about proper rights-holders touch upon—the fact of competing legal
and political authorities. Tose bodies with roots in traditional systems exercise
parallel and independent authority over not just community members but the
community’s lands and waters. Limiting struggles between these bodies and local
Aboriginal communities (state-generated band councils) to essentially cultural
matters strips away these deeper layers of understanding, and seems designed to
further entrench in the minds and actions of Indigenous peoples the sense that
they can only hope for certain kinds of understandings of both problems and
58. Tese are determinations made in a subjective manner, with input from the nature of lives
they fnd themselves living as members of groups.
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solutions, those emanating from centuries of development of liberal democratic
thought in the West.
We have touched upon the deepest level at which the clash between Indigenous
communities and state is located, as the ground level of this layered clash brought
to the surface is not just between potentially competing authorities but is rather
between diferently grounded political bodies. Te clash is between theories of
how society can and should be structured. Pushing back on how Canadian courts
hope to tame Indigenous aspirations is vital, not just for the recognition of the
true rights-holders, but to signal the continuing life of alternate understandings
of how humans can live in the world.

